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The m ain theoretical proposal to be made in this paper is that existential force may 
have two sources. It may be contributed by either indefinite arguments or by certain 
predicates. I will argue against the current view that subsumes B NPs under the 
analysis of indefinites and assume instead that BNPs are property-denoting 
expressions (see also McNally (1995» , which as such cannot contribute existential 
force.  The obvious problems regarding semantic composition raised by this 
hypothesis can be solved by defining a class of predicates that are able to apply to 
property-denoting arguments. I will argue that the crucial property of such predicates 
is that they allow (some of) their argument-variables to be bound by existential 
closure and correlatively translate as lambda-abstracts over the properties that restrict 
those argument-variables. This proposal allows us to derive the (correct part) of the 
Milsark-Carlson constraints on the existential reading of BNPs from type-matching 
c onstraints. 
1.  The Representation of Indefini tes and Bare Plurals 
My analysis of BNPs is c lose to that of Farkas (1985) and Dobrovie-Sorin&Laca 
( 1996) , who argue that the existential and generic readings of BNPs cannot be given 
a unified account. I will assume that the two interpretations rely on property- and 
kind-denotation ,  respectively. 
All theorists agree that insofar as BNPs lack determiners, they are to be 
analyzed as predicates, i.e. as property-denoting « e,t>-type) expressions. 1 It is 
however currently assumed that this analysis cannot be correct for the B NPs that 
occupy A-positions, because it would give rise to type-mismatch between semantic 
type and distribution (A-positions can only be occupied by entity-denoting DPs or by 
D Ps that denote generalized quantifiers, e and « e,t>,t>-type expressions,  
respectively).  It is  for this reason (which is  however not always explicitely 
acknowledged) that most theorists (see Kratzer (1988, 1995), Diesin g  (1992), etc . )  
extend the Lewis-Kamp-Heim analysis of indefinites to  BNPs : o n  a par  with 
indefinites, B NPs are assumed to contribute variables. 
In what follows I will go against this trend : BNPs cannot contribute LF 
variables, but are to be analyzed as property-denoting (see also 'McNall y  (1995)). 
The type-mismatch problem can be solved by assuming that certain predicates may 
be represented in such a way that they may apply to property-denoting expressions 
(Section 2). 
This analysis of BNPs leads to a revision of the analysis of indefmites itself. 
S ince (i) B NPs may occur in A-positions and nevertheless preserve property­
denotation ,  and (ii) indefinites at large may be property-denoting (see their 
occurrence in predicate position), we are led to conclude that indefinites at large may 
preserve property- d e n o tation when they occur in A-posit i o n s . 2  B u t  i n  
contradistinction t o  existential BNPs, other indefinites may also contribute L F  
variables. 
Turning now to generic BNPs, I will follow Dobrovie-Sorin&Laca (1996) in 
assum ing Carlson's (1977) hypothesis according to which they function as proper 
names of kinds. Since I do not think that a Carlsonian analysis can be maintained for 
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the existential reading of BNPs, I am led to assume that English B NPs are 
ambiguous between property-denotation and kind-denotation. I believe that the 
ambiguity thesis is an unescapable3 but not so damaging assumption insofar as we 
need not assume lexical ambiguity. The kind-type denotation can be obtained from 
the property-type denotation by standard type-shifting functions p arallel to syntactic 
operations such as nominalization (Chierchia (1984, 1996» : the primitive denotation 
of dogs is the property of being dogs and the derived, type-shifted denotation is the 
kind 'dog'.  
The analysis of English BNPs adopted here leaves open the possibility that 
some languages might lack the type-shifting mechanism .4 Such languages would 
allow existential B NPs (since they rely on property-denotation),  but not generic 
B NPs (since they are kind-denoting, type-shifted BNPs) . This is  precisely what 
happens in Rom ance languages such as Spanish, Romanian and Italian.5 This 
crosslinguistic variation is difficult to understand if we assume Carlson's (1977) 
hypothesis, recently revived by Chierchia (1996), that BNPs in argument-positions 
are unambiguously kind-denoting: if  they were, we would expect the generic reading 
to be possible in all those languages that allow bare plurals and bare mass nouns to 
appear in argument positions. 
Condoravdi (1992, 1994) has firmly established that B NPs have a third 
reading, which is clearly distinct from both the generic and the existential readings. 
On this third construal, labelled quasi-universal here, B NPs are understood as 
referring to the totality of the contextually relevant entities that satisfy the descriptive 
content of the BNP. Condoravdi argues that examples such as (1) are ambiguous 
between the existential and the quasi-universal reading. On the latter reading, BNPs 
are in free variation with definite plurals and are translatable by definite plurals in 
Romance languages: . 
( 1 )  a .  Linguistic theories have posited abstract representations. 
b .  Rescue teams have rescued 28,950 victims. 
c .  Details will be presented tomorrow. 
d .  Prices went up today. 
Since the quasi-universal reading is crucial for the analysis of the existential reading 
i tself, let me briefly summarize its main properties: (i) quasi-universal B NPs 
presuppose the existence of the entities that satisfy the descriptive content of the 
BNP (ii) contextual presuppositions cannot be cancelled ; (iii) the pronouns that 
anaphorize them may take either an E-type or a totality reading ; (iv) they may 
cooccur with adverbs of quantity such as mostlylfor the most part (this observation 
is due to Lahiri (1991» . Let me finally add the monotonicity tests, which seem to 
have escaped Condoravdi's attention: 
(2) a .  Students were old (yesterday night) *> People were old 
b .  Students were dancing in the street => People were dancing in the street. 
Because (2)a is built with an i-level predicate, the existential reading is blocked. The 
only reading allowed in (2)a  is a quasi-universal readin g ,  w h i c h  h as the 
monotonicity properties of universals and definite DPs. Compare the existential 
reading of the BNP in (2)b. 
Condoravdi observes that most of the properties listed above plead in favor 
of an analysis that would assimilate quasi-universal BNPs to definite, rather than 
indefinite descriptions. This analysis is however dismissed by Condoravdi because 
of the fact that quasi-universal BNPs cannot be anaphoric. Whenever an antecedent 
is overtly introduced in the previous discourse, the quasi-universal reading is 
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blocked. The examples in (3)b are uninterpretable because the existential reading is 
itself blocked (old is i-level): 
(3) a. There are lions and tigers in this cage. 
b .  ?* Lions are old. 
c .  The lions are old. 
In view of this important difference between quasi-universal B NPs and definite 
expressions, Condoravdi assumes that quasi-universal B NPs are indefinite 
expressions of a special type. I will argue instead in favor of analyzing quasi­
universal B NPs as a special sort of definite expression, one which is non-anaphoric. 
More precisely, I will assume that there is no intrin sic difference between 
generic and quasi-universal B NPs: they are exactly the same kind of linguistic entity, 
namely a type-shifted BNP (notated here nBNP; in rdog, the diacritic n notates the 
type-shifting operator that turns the property dogs into the corresponding maximal 
set of individuals that satisfy the property of being dogs» , which takes two distinct 
readings depending on the linguistic context in which it appears. Those predicates 
that are marked as generic (by particular tense-aspectual features) give rise to the 
generic, kind-denoting, reading of maximal-set-denoting BNPs, whereas episodic 
predicates normally give rise to the quasi-universal reading, under which the B NP 
refers to a contextually-determined maximal set. Note however that kind-relevant 
episodic predicates in examples such as Musk-rats arrived in Europe in the 16th ct 
allow the kind-type denotation of BNPs. The view adopted here can be summarized 
as in (4): 
(4) a. Pepisodic (n BNP) 
b. Pgeneric (n BNP) 
c .  l'Jcind.relevant episodic (n BNP) 
-> quasi-universal reading 
-> generic readingS 
-> generic reading 
The proposal outlined here seems natural for quasi-universal B NPs. Their definite­
like behavior (the totality-effect, the presupposition of existence, the fact that they 
can combine with adverbs of quantity, their monotonicity properties) is due to the 
fact that they denote a maximal set, and this is directly obtained by the type-shifting 
mechanism itself (in order to obtain a non-maximal set we would need an indication 
of quantity or a type-shifter such as some). Note furthermore that the characteristic 
non-anaphoricity of quasi-universal BNPs is also expected : anaphoricity is 
contributed by the definite article, and BNPs lack it. Our theory also accounts for a 
clear cross-linguistic generalization : quasi-universal readings appear only in those 
languages that also have generic BNPs. This is  due to the fact that both these 
readings rely on the type-shifting operation described above, which is language­
specific. Compare the property-denotation of B NPs, which is universal (although 
languages may differ as to whether they allow BNPs to appear in A-positions). 
The existence of the quasi-universal reading of BNPs is problematic for the 
two most influential theories of BNPs. Beyond their divergent analyses of B NPs, 
C arlson (1977) on the one hand and Kratzer (1988, 1995), Wilkinson ( 1 991) and 
Diesing ( 1992) on the other hand, are alike insofar as they attempt to propose unified 
accounts, which assign a unique LF translation to the B NP itself: B NPs are 
unambiguously kind-denoting for Carlson (1977) and Chierchia (1996), and 
indefinite- like, i .e. , variable-contributing expressions, for Kratzer-Wilkinson-
Diesing7 The distinct interpretations would be obtained as a consequence of the 
linguistic context in which the BNP appears. But precisely because they are based on 
a non-ambiguous treatment of BNPs, these theories cannot account for the quasi-
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universal reading of BNPs. The problem is that in one and the same type of context. 
namely episodic predications. BNPs may take either the existential or the quasi­
universal readings. Since the context is identical. the difference in interpretation may 
only come from a difference located inside the BNP itself. In sum. the existence of 
the quasi-universal reading is clear evidence in favor of an ambiguous treatment of 
BNPs like the one assumed by Farkas ( 1 985) and Dobrovie-Sorin&Laca ( 1 996). 
2. Semanti c  Composi tion 
The hypothesis that existential BNPs denote properties seems problematic insofar as 
it g ives rise to type-mismatch. On the assumption that main predicates denote 
properties « e.t>-type). they may apply to DPs that denote individuals or generalired 
quantifiers (e and <e, <e,t» types. respectively). but not to property-denoting 
expressions. In what follows I will show that this problem can be solved by 
assuming a type-shifted denotation for the main predicate. 
2.1.  Predicates that Denote Properties of Entities 
I will argue that (the correct part of) Milsark's generalizations follow from type­
matching constraints. The central idea will be that i-level predicates block the 
existential reading of BNPs not because they denote permanent properties, but rather 
because they can only apply to entity-denoting expressions (entity-predicates.  
henceforth): 
(5) a .  Students are intelligent. 
b .  I was in Berkeley in 1985. Students were intelligent there. 
The existential reading of students is blocked in (5)a-b because (i) existential B NPs 
are property-denoting « e,t>-type expressions) and (ii) intelligent is an entity­
predicate, which cannot form a proposition by applying to an <e,t>-type expression. 
Type-matching allows kind-denoting BNPs (e-type expression) to combine with 
entity-predicates. Hence. the grammaticality of (5)a. constructed with an i-level 
predicate that applies to a type-shifted. kind-denoting BNP: 
( 5 ' )  AX.X i s  intelligent (nSTUDENfS) 
As to (5)b. also this example is legitimate with respect to type-matching, on a par 
with (5)a. if we assume a type-shifted denotation for the. BNP. Thus. (5)a and (5)b 
rely on the same type of LF representation. but they get different interpretations as a 
function of the context. Because it appears in an episodic context, (5)b cannot get the 
generic reading. but may take the quasi-universal reading: (5)b talks about all the 
students in Berkeley in 1985 (the BNP would be translated by a definite plural in 
Romance languages). 
The question arises whether the class of entity-predicates is empirically 
identical to the class of i-level predicates. The answer is negative, but I postpone a 
detailed discussion of this issue until Section 3. 
2.2. Predicates with Existentially Closed Argument- Variables 
We must now explain why the existential reading of BNPs is allowed with certain 
predicates, see in particular the following examples: 
(6) 
(7) 
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a .  Look! People are sleeping/dancing in  the street. 
b .  His office was upside down. Books were lying on the floor. 
a .  Butter w as  melting o n  a plate. 
b .  Ink covered the ground. 
Given the remarks in the preceding paragraph, the main predicates of these examples 
cannot be analyzed as denoting properties of entities. What we need is to translate the 
predicate of the clause in such a way that it may apply to a property-denoting 
expression. In what follows I will propose that the crucial property of such 
predicates (existential predicates henceforth) is that they allow the existential closure 
of their argument variables (th-variables henceforth). 
Let us assume that there are two distinct ways of binding th-variables: 
(8) Th-variables are bound 
(a) by A-abstraction (subject to no lexical constraint) 
or 
(b) by existential closure (subject to a yet-nonidentified constraint). 
By the free application of lambda-abstraction over th-variables we obtain entity­
predicates, i .e . ,  predicates that denote sets/properties of entities. Any kind of 
predicate may be translated in this way, and when it does, it can only combine with 
expressions that denote entities (individuals, groups, kinds). In more intuitive terms, 
entity-predicates are unsaturated expressions waiting for argument DPs to fill their 
th-slots. 
The other way in which th-variables may be bound is by existential closure. 
Predicates with existentially-closed variables are already saturated and as a 
consequence no argument DP is needed. Correlatively, existential predicates contain 
a A-operator over the property that restricts the range (provide the descriptive content 
of) of the existentially-closed th-variable. Such predicates may apply to property­
denoting expressions. The examples in (6)-(7 )  would thus have LF representations 
of the type shown in (6')-(7'): 
( 6 ' )  a .  AP3x [x i s  sleeping /\ P(x)] (people) 
( 7 ' )  a .  AP3x [ x  i s  melting o n  a plate /\ P(x)] (butter) 
=> (A-conversion) 
(6" ) a.  3x [x is sleeping /\ people (x)] 
(7 " )  a .  3 x  [x i s  melting o n  a plate /\ butter (x)] 
It is important to stress that the variables that appear in these representations are not 
obtained via the translation of the BNPs themselves (BNPs do not translate as 
variables) ,  but correspond instead to slots in the argument structure of the clausal 
predicate. 
Our proposal resembles Carlson's ( 1 977) hypothesis that the existential 
reading of BNPs does not rely on the existential quantifier being contributed by the 
BNP itself, but rather by the main predicate. However, the two analyses do not 
agree on the empirical definition of the relevant class of predicates. According to the 
analysis proposed here, the distinction between entity-predicates and existential 
predicates is due to a yet-nonidentified constraint on the existential c losure of th­
variables. As argued in Section 3.  below, our distinction cuts across the i- vs s-level 
classification. Note further that our two types of predicates do not apply to the same 
type of BNPs, as assumed by Carlson. 
1 2 1  
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It is clear that the crucial assumption on which my analysis rests is the one 
stated in (8)b, according to which th-variables can be bound by existential closure. 
Note however that this hypothesis is not an ad-hoc stipulation, it already exists in the 
current syntactic theory, where it is motivated on independent grounds. It is well­
known that certain arguments may remain "implicit",  that is, no syntactic constituent 
corresponds to a given argument-variable (see in particular transitive verbs such as 
write, eat, read, etc. ,  which need not syntactically realize their direct object). Among 
the various analyses of this well-known phenomenon the m ost plausible one says 
that the object-position is saturated by existential closure in the Lexicon, and hence 
does not project in the syntax. Thus, the only particular claim made here is that the 
procedure in (8)b is active not only for implicit arguments, but also for property­
denoting arguments. 
3. Existential Closure and Space Localization 
To recapitulate, I have so far proposed a theoretical characterization of two types of 
predicates. We must now find an empirical basis for this distinction. I will first show 
that the relevant distinction is neither the i- vs s-level partition nor the aspectual 
distinction between stative and non-stative predicates. The proposal will be that 
Space Localization provides the empirical basis for our distinction. 
3. 1.  The i-level vs s-level Distinction 
According to the Milsark-Carlson generalizations, i-level predicates block the 
existential reading of BNPs, whereas s-level predicates allow it: 
(9) a. I-level predicates force the generic reading of BNP subjects. 
b .  S-level predicates allow both the existential and the generic readings of 
BNP subjects. 
Although they went unnoticed for almost twenty years, important counterexamples 
to the Milsark-Carlson generalizations exist (Glasbey (1995) , B osveld-de Smet 
(1995) ,  McNally (1995), Kiss (1995) and Dobrovie-Sorin (1995» :8 
(10) Students were cheerfuVnervouslangry. 
These examples are constructed with s-Ievel predicates, but they do not allow the 
existential reading. 
The behavior of emotional states is not isolated, but seems to be general with 
s-level predicates expressed by adjectives (leaving aside available, present, visible, 
to be discussed below): 
(11) a. ?? During Chomsky's lecture, top-models were asleep/drunk/tired at the 
back of the room. 
b. ?? During the show, dogs were asleep/hungry on the ground. 
The question marks are meant to indicate that these examples are m arginally 
interpretable, but only with the quasi-universal reading, which is excluded here due 
to the descriptive content of the various elements in the sentence.9 Crucial for the 
present argument is the fact that the existential reading is blocked. 
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As observed by Kiss ( 1 995), counterexamples to (9)a also exist, which 
indicate that s-level predication is not even a necessary condition on the existential 
reading of BNPs: 
( 1 2) a .  Forests border the castle. 
b .  Trees line the road. 
In sum, the i- vs s-level distinction does not seem to predict correctly the readings of 
BNPs. We m ust therefore find another empirical criterion for our theoretical 
distinction between entity- and existential predicates. 
3.2. Stativity 
Most of the examples quoted in the preceding paragraph suggest the following 
tentative hypothesis: 
( 1 3) Non-stative predicates may translate as existential predicates. 
True enough, all non-stative predicates seem to allow the existential reading of 
English B NPs. It is not true, however, that all stative predicates disallow the 
existential reading. Among adjectives, there is the well-known class of available, 
visible, present: 
( 1 4) a.  Water is available. 
b .  Students were present/available. 
Stative verbs also exist, which allow the existential reading of their BNP subjects 
(see also the examples in ( 1 2» : 
( 1 5)  a .  Books were lying o n  the floor. 
b .  A statue was standing in front of the park. 
Taking into account this kind of data, Kiss ( 1 995) has formulated the following 
disjunctive constraint: 
( 1 6) In order for it to allow the existential reading of preverbal subjects, the main 
predicate must be either non-stative or existential. 
3.3. Existentiality and Space-Localization 
To the best of my knowledge Kiss's generalization is empirically correct. There are 
however two points that need to be elucidated. First, we must discover the empirical 
criterion that allows us to isolate "existential " statives, i .e . ,  those statives that allow 
the existential reading of their BNP subjects, from those that do not Then, we m ust 
try to unify the two parts of the disjunction in ( 1 6). 
The empirical generalization stated in ( 1 7) seems to give the correct results 
regarding the partition among statives: 
( 1 7)  Stative predicates allow the existential reading of their B NP subjects only if  
the subject argument is  Space localized with respect to a co-argument . 
This generalization directly accounts for the examples in ( 1 2) and ( 1 5),  in which the 
subject is localized with respect to the direct object and the PrepP, respectively. In 
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these examples, the direct objects, as well as the PrePs, function as arguments rather 
than adjuncts (they cannot be suppressed and cannot be viewed as modifiers of the 
main predicate). Turning now to the examples in ( 1 4) ,  it is reasonable to assume that 
predicates such as present and available take a Locative argument (which indicates 
the location of the subject), although that argument may remain implicit (it is well­
known that adjectives allow their arguments to stay implicit more easily than verbs 
do) .  
It is important to observe that adjunct Space Localizers are unable to license 
the existential reading of the BNP subjects of (i-level or s-level) statives: 
( 1 8) a .  Books are cheap in Paris. 
b .  Cows are sacred animals in India. 
c .  In Italy, five-year-olds know how to play soccer. 
( 1 9) Children were sicklhappy/nasty in school. 
This kind of data is captured by the generalization in ( 17), since the PrepPs in ( 1 8)­
( 19) cannot be analyzed as arguments of cheap, sacred animal, or know. In these 
examples, the PrepPs can be viewed as localizing the predication relation itself rather 
than the arguments of the predication relation. 
The generalizations that emerge from this discussion can be summarized as 
follows: 
(20) a. Space modifiers/adjuncts localize states, but not the individuals of which 
the states hold. 
b .  The arguments of statives can be localized relative to a co-argument. 
This restatement allows us to propose that statives are existential iff their arguments 
can be Space-localized. In order to achieve a unified account of non-statives and 
statives, let us formulate this constraint in its general form: 
(2 1 )  A predicate is existential iff (one of) its arguments can be space-localized. 
Kiss's observation that all non-statives qualify as existential follows from (2 1 )  on 
the natural assumption that in the case of non-statives, Space modifiers localize not 
only the eventuality denoted by the predicate, but also the participants to that 
eventuality. Since any predicate may, given an appropriate context, allow Space­
modification, it follows that all non-statives are existential. With statives on the other 
hand, Space modifiers/adjuncts localize only the state but not the individuals that are 
said to be in that state. Which means that Space-modification is not sufficient for 
statives to count as existential . What is needed is that their arguments be localized 
with respect to a co-argument. 
In order to establish a relation between the theoretical proposal concerning 
existential predicates (the fact that an existential operator is built into their lexical 
representation) and the empirical characterization based on Space Localization, we 
can assume that the already postulated constraint on existential closure is precisely 
Space-Localization. Hence, the binding of th-variables formulated in (8) can now be 
restated as in (22): 
(22) Th-variables are bound 
(a) by A-abstraction (subject to no lexical constraint) 
or 
(b) by existential closure only if they are Space-localized. 
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As a consequence of (22), the argument-variables of predicates such as intelligent, 
tired, etc. ,  can only be licensed by a A-operator. In other words, such predicates can 
only denote properties of entities. Compare predicates such as sleep, dance, melt, 
etc. and lie, border, available, etc. ,  whose subject arguments can be space-localized, 
and therefore can be bound in the two ways stated in (22). 10 
It should be observed that the notions of existential and entity-predicates may 
be used to refer either to a lexical classification of predicates or to the use of 
predicates in particular linguistic contexts. Thus, predicates such as sleep, dance, 
etc . ,  which are listed as existential in the Lexicon, may contextually function as 
either existential or entity-predicates. Entity-predicates, on the other hand, can only 
function as entity-predicates. ! !  It can further be observed that the lexical 
characterization of predicates proposed here is stated in terms of their contextual 
possibilities. The definition in (2 1 )  may indeed be restated as in (23): 
(23) A predicate is l isted as existential in the Lexicon iff it m ay function as 
existential in a particular linguistic context, i.e. , iff (one of) its arguments 
can be bound by existential closure. 
Let me stress that the classification proposed here cuts across the i- vs s- level 
distinction. This means that entity-predicates may be either i-level (intelligent, poor, 
smart, etc . )  or s-level (tired, dirty, happy, etc .) .  I assume that s-level entity­
predicates denote properties of a particular type of entities, namely stages of entities 
in the sense of Carlson ( 1 977), i .e. ,  temporal slices of entities, or time-indexed 
entities (e.g . ,  "Mary-today" ,  "Mary-tomorrow" ,  etc.) .  
(24) a.  Ax. x is intelligent/good-looking. (x is an entity) 
b .  Ax. x is hungry/tired/old/fresh. (x is a stage-of-entity) 
c .  Ax. x sleeps/dances/melts (x is a stage-of-entity) 
Given this characterization of the relevant types of predicates, let us examine the data 
that constitute counterexamples to the Milsark-Carlson generalizations. Examples 
(25)a-d are borrowed from McNally ( 1 995), (25)e was brought to my attenttion by 
Anna Szabolcsi (p.c .),  and (25)f is borrowed from Diesing ( 1 988),  who analyzes it 
as having the existential reading): 
(25) a. 
b. 






Dinner plates were frlthy. 
Committee members were bored. 
Graduate students were sleepy at the meeting. 
Rooms in the house were cold. 
Teachers are overworked and tired. You can't expect them to care about 
the pupils. 
People are hungry. 
Contrabassoonists were cheerfuVnervousiangry 
During Chomsky's lecture, students were asleep/drunklhungry/tired. 
These examples are constructed with s- Ievel predicates that qualify as entity­
predicates, and as such they cannot apply to property-denoting B NPs (hence the 
impossibility of the existential reading). They may instead combine with type-shifted 
BNPs: 
(25 ' )  a. AX.X is frlthy (nplates) 
1 25 
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This LF representation underlies the quasi-universal reading that characterizes these 
examples. The generic reading is blocked because of the episodic context 
When used in generic contexts, certain s-level predicates may be interpreted 
as dispositional or habitual properties, and as such they allow the generic reading of 
BNPs: 
(26) a. Contrabassoonists are cheerful. 
b.  Students read a lot 
(26') a. Ax.X is cheerful (ncontrabassoonists) 
It should be observed that the analysis proposed here is not based on the idea that the 
predicate distinction relevant for the existential reading of preverbal subjects is 
identical to the distinction that is relevant for there-sentences.  The most striking 
evidence in favor of keeping the two phenomena separate is the behavior of locative 
PPs, see the contrast between (27) and (28): 
(27) a. [I looked out of the window]. ?Students were in the street 
b .  [I opened the door]. ?Students were on the door step. 
c .  [His office was upside down.] ??Books were on the table. 
d .  [His office was upside down.] ??Flowers were on the table. 
(28) a. There were (three) students in the street. 
b. In the street there were (three) students. 
The existential reading of the BNP subjects appears to be blocked in (27)a-d (these 
examples can only take the quasi-universal reading), but allowed in (28).  The 
question that arises first is why existential closure is blocked in (27), 1 2  despite the 
presence of a Space Localizer. The answer is already contained in the way in which 
we formulated the constraint on existential closure: it may apply to the arguments of 
a certain predicate only if those arguments are localized. Com pare the examples 
under discussion here, where the Locative PP is neither an adjunct nor an argument, 
but instead functions as the main predicate of the clause (the copula is assigned no 
semantic value at all). Given the proposal made here. we m ust assume that 
Localizing PrepPs are to be analyzed as entity-predicates, 1 3  i .e., they denote the set 
of objects at a certain Location. 
Turning now to there-sentences, there are at least two characteristics that set 
them apart from the corresponding sentences with preverbal subjects: (a) existence is 
overtly asserted ; (b) the Localizer does not function as a predicate. The latter 
property is supported by the fact that the position of the Localizer is not fixed, see 
(28)a and (28)b. Compare configurations of the type NP copula PP, where the PP 
cannot be displaced, because it functions as the clausal predicate: 
(29) a. Three students are in the street. 
b .  *In the street three students are. 
One might thus argue that in there-sentences the copula functions as a predicate of 
existence and the PP as a locative argument, hence the existential reading of the 
postverbal subject. 
In sum, the contrast between (27) and (28) is captured by our constraints on 
existential closure. A similar contrast is given in (30)a-b: 
(30) a. There were students tired. 
b. Students were tired (OK quasi-universal reading; *exist.) 
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In (30)b tired is an entity-predicate that functions as the main predicate of the clause, 
hence the observed unavailability of the existential reading. In (30)a, on the other 
hand, the main predicate is were (which counts here as an existence predicate). 
Although tired differs from Localizers insofar as its position is fixed in there­
sentences, it nevertheless does not function as the main predicate of the sentence. 
3.4. Generic and Existential Objects 
In this section it will be shown that by extending our proposal to two-position 
predicates, we can provide a solution to a long-standing puzzle (Kanouse ( 1 972), 
Lawler ( 1 973),  Declerck ( 1 987), Laca ( 1990» . 14 In the object-position of verbs 
such as love, hate, respect, etc. ,  BNPs can take the generic, but not the existential 
reading: 
(3 1 )  a .  Boys love girls . 
b .  Students respect professors 
c .  Journalists hate politicians. 
The constraint on existential closure stated in (22) straightforwardly accounts for 
(3 1 ) ,  in which neither the subject nor the object can be Space-localized: 
(32) a .  * John respects Mary in Paris. 
b .  *Where do you respect Mary? 
Since the th-variables of love, respect, hate, etc. cannot be Space-localized, they 
cannot be licensed by existential closure (see (22)b), so that these predicates can only 
translate as unsaturated expressions, waiting for both their argument-positions to be 
filled by entity-denoting (e-type) nominal expressions: 
( 3 1 ' )  AyAx. x loves y 
Such predicates cannot compose with property-denoting expressions « e,t> types), 
and in particular with property-denoting BNPs. This explains why the existential 
reading of B NPs is disallowed. The only possibility is for the B NPs to be type­
shifted to kind-denotation, hence the generic reading: 
(3 1 ') a. AyAx. x love y (nGIRLS) (nBOYS) 
-> A-conversion 
(3 1 " )  a. nGIRLS love nBOYS 
Our proposal can also account for examples such as (33), in which the object can be 
interpreted existentially, although the subject cannot do so: 
(33) a .  Rich farmers own donkeys. 
b .  Manuscripts contain(s) typos. 
In the case of verbs like own and contain, only the location of the object is specified: 
(34) a. John owns apartments in Venice. 
b .  This book contains typos in the Introduction. 
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By virtue of (22), only the object variable can be licensed by existential closure, the 
subject-position must abstracted over: 
(33 ') a. AP Axl 3X2 (Xl owns x2 1\ P (X2» 
b. AP Axl3x2 (Xl contains x2 1\ P (X2» 
Given this representation, the subject position is to be filled by an entity-denoting 
expression, therefore the BNP obligatorily takes a maximal-set-type denotation. The 
object position, on the other hand, need not be filled by an entity-denoting 
expression, because it can be bound by existential closure; the BNP provides the 
descriptive content of the th-variable: 15 
(33 " )  a .  AP  AXI  3X2 (X l  owns x2 1\ P (X2» (Ilrich farmers) (donkeys) 
b .  AP AXl3x2 (X l contains x2 1\ P (X2» (nmanuscripts) (typos) 
=> A-conversion 
(33" )  a .  3X2 [Ilrich farmers own X 2  1\ donkeys (X2)] 
b .  3X2 [nmanuscripts contain X2 1\ typos (X2)] 
In sum, our classification of predicates based on Space Localization solves the 
problem of generic objects. I 6  Since it is exactly the same classification that allowed 
us to account for the interpretation of BNPs in subject position, a unified analysis of 
subject and object BNPs is achieved. Our proposal is at the same time more 
explanatory: the generalization in (35) follows from type-matching constraints: 
(35) Entity-predicates block the existential reading of BNPs. 
Note that the notion of entity-predicate used here is not "predicate that denotes a set 
of entities" .  Given the account proposed here, an entity-predicate is a predicate that 
has at least one argument-position that cannot be existentially closed (because it 
cannot be localized), and hence is abstracted over. In the general case, such a 
predicate denotes a set of ordered n-tuples of entities. An entity-predicate denotes a 
set of entities in the particular case in which only one argument-position is abstracted 
over. 
4. Deri ving the Readi ngs of Indefinites 
4. 1.  Existential BNPs and Existential Indefinites in Object Position 
In contradistinction to B NPs. indefinites may take the existential reading when 
occurring in the object position of verbs like love or hate: 
(36) a.  John loves a girl. 
b .  John respects two professors. 
c .  John hates a politician. 
As already established in the previous section, the verbs in (36) can only combine 
with entity-denoting expressions. This constraint blocks the existential reading of 
BNPs. because that reading relies on property-denotation. Note however that the 
same constraint does not affect the existential reading of indefinites. because 
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indefinites may contribute LF variables (e-type expressions). In (36') the main 
predicate translates as a lambda-abstract that applies to the variable contributed by the 
indefinite: 
(36 ' )  a .  Ay.Ax. x loves y (John ) (x) /\ girl (x) 
b .  Ay.AX. x respects y (John) (x) /\ girl (x) /\ two (x) 
In sum, the distinction proposed here between entity- and existential 
predicates m akes different predictions concerning the existential reading of B NPs 
and the existential reading of indefinites: 
(37) a. Entity-predicates block the existential reading of BNPs. 
b .  Entity-predicates do not block the existential reading of indefmites. 
The differential behavior of the two kinds of existential readings is due to the fact 
that they differ with respect to the semantic type of the DP: existential indefinites and 
existential BNPs are e-type and <e,t> type expressions, respectively. The distinction 
proposed here, between entity- and existential-predicates, is sensitive precisely to 
this difference. Compare Milsark's ( 1 977) generalizations (see also the current 
literature based on them, e.g. Kratzer ( 1 988, 1 995), Diesing ( 1 992» , which treat the 
existential readings of BNPs and of indefinites on a par: they are both "weak",  and 
as such should be blocked by i-level predicates. 
4.2. Existential BNPs and Existential Indefinites in Subject Position 
I have so far shown that the contrast between existential BNPs and existenti al 
indefinites can be observed in the object-position. The examples in (38)a-b show that 
the same contrast arises in the subject position: 
(38) a. Girl-students were already tired. 
b .  Sm girl-students were already tired. 
These examples show that s-level entity-predicates such as tired block the existential 
reading of BNP subjects, but allow the existential reading of indefinite subjects. 
These judgments are clearly indicated by the monotonicity tests (see also 
Condoravdi's ( 1 994) other tests reviewed in section 1 .3 .  above): 
(39) a .  Girl-students were already ti red "#> Students were already 
tired . 1 7  
tired. 
b .  Sm girl-students were already tired => Sm students were already 
The contrast in  (38)a-b is predicted by our analysis according to whichtired is an 
entity-predicate. Such a predicate cannot apply to <e,t>-type expressions (hence the 
unavailability of the existential reading). The quasi-universal reading is allowed, 
since it relies on maximal-set denotation (e-type): 
( 3 8 ') a .  AX. x were already tired (ngirl-students) 
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Turning now to (38)b, this example can take the existential reading, because the 
indefinite headed by sm can translate as a variable, which is an e-type expression, 
and as such may combine with an entity-predicate: 
(38 ' )  b .  AX. x were already tired (x) A girl-students (x» 
4.3. Existential and Presuppositional Indefinites 
It thus appears that the predicate distinction proposed here captures distinctions that 
are finer than those predicted by Milsark ( 1977). who treats the existential readings 
of BNPs and indefinites on a par. But correlatively. there is a distinction that cannot 
be captured by our classification of predicates. namely that between existential and 
presuppositionaI/partitive indefinites. Contrasts such as that illustrated in (40) cannot 
be accounted for: 
(40) a.  *Sm girl-students are tall. 
b .  Some girl-students are tall. 
(40)a shows that i-level predicates cannot apply to DPs headed by sm. Milsark's 
( 1 977) account of the data goes as follows: (i) indefinites headed by sm can only 
take the weak reading; (ii) i-level predicates can only combine with strong DPs. 
Note first that this account is purely descriptive. it lacks explanatory power. 
since it follows from no independently motivated principle. More importantly. there 
are counterexamples to this residue of Milsark's generalizations. The clearest one 
was suggested to me by Liliane Tasmowski (p.c.). Suppose you are making a movie 
about Native Americans. You arrive on the set, look at the actors. and say: 
(4 1 )  This i s  ridiculous ! S m  actors are red-haired ! 
In contradistinction to (40)a. the example in (4 1 )  shows that indefinites headed by 
sm are allowed to combine with i-level predicates. We are thus led to conclude that 
the existential reading of subject indefinites constructed with i-level predicates is not 
ruled out by syntactico-semantic principles (but instead is sensitive to the 
extrasentential context. as discussed at the end of this section). Since within the 
analysis proposed here. s-level entity-predicates are treated on a par with i-level 
predicates. they are also expected to allow the existential reading of indefinites. The 
following examples are adapted from Galmiche ( 1 986). who is concerned with 
French indefinites headed by des: 
(42) a .  Sm glasses are empty/ chipped. 
b .  Sm forks are dirty. 
c .  S m  flowers are withered. 
d .  Sm chairs are wobbly. 
As already explained in §4.2 .• our theory predicts that the existential reading of these 
examples is allowed: the entity-predicate applies to the variable contributed by the 
indefinite. 
The ungrammaticality of (40)a should not. however. be overlooked:  it 
indicates that the compatibility between entity-predicates and existential indefinites 
may vary from one sentence to another. although no general constraint can be easily 
formulated. One factor that seems relevant is the descriptive content of the situation 
referred to in the sentence. which is evaluated with respect to norm aU standard/ 
expected situations. It thus appears that the existential reading of indefinites 
constructed with (i-level and s-level) entity-predicates is subject to certain constraints 
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imposed by the sentential or extra-sentential context (for further empirical evidence in 
favor of this conclusion see Laca&Tasmowski ( 1 996» : (40)a is unacceptable, the 
example in (4 1 )  needs an explicit context, and (42)a-d are acceptable only for certain 
lexical choices (compare ? ?sm glasses are full, ? ?sm forks are clean, etc.) .  By 
contrast, no such context-sensitivity arises for those examples in which an indefinite 
(or a BNP) combines with an existential predicate: 
(43) a. Sm top-models were attending the mess. 
b .  Sm flowers were lying on the floor. 
I believe that the context-sensitivity under discussion here follows from the standard 
DRT-view that the existential closure of the variables contributed by indefinites 
applies over assignment functions, during the process of truth-value-assessment: 1 8 
since the process of truth-value assessment takes place in a given context, it is 
expected to be context-sensitive. 
The examples constructed with existential predicates (see (43)a-b) are not 
context-sensitive, because such predicates translate as propositional formulas with 
the subject th-variable legitimated - at LF - by the existential operator contributed by 
the predicate itself (the indefmite itself translates as a complex predicate that provides 
the descriptive content of the th-variable). Correlatively, existential closure does not 
apply during the process of truth-value-assessment, and as a consequence no 
context-sensitivity arises. 
Summarizing,  the type of lexical predicate constrains the existential reading 
of BNPs because this reading relies on the existential operator being contributed by 
the main predicate. The existential reading of indefmites, on the other hand, may rely 
on the existential closure of the variable contributed by the indefinite, which is 
basically unconstrained at the syntactico-semantic level. An important outcome of 
this analysis is that the choice between existential and presuppositional/ partitive 
indefinites is not sensitive to lexical classifications of main predicates (contra 
Milsark's generalizations adopted by the current literature, see in particular Kratzer 
( 1 988 ,  1 995) and Diesing ( 1992» . This result converges with Reinhart's ( 1 995) 
position, according to which presuppositional effects should be viewed as a problem 
of language use rather than as a property encoded in the computational system, i.e., 
such effects follow from pragmatic conditions on the way sentences are actually 
used. 
E n d n otes 
*The initial idea of this paper was presented at Langues et grammaires 2 (Paris, June 
1 995) and Non-lexical Semantics (Paris, June 1 996). The present version has 
benefited from comments by Claire Beyssade, Ed Keenan, Brenda Laca, Jean-Claude 
Milner, Anna Szabolcsi, Liliane Tasmowski and Elisabeth Villalta. Special thanks go 
to Olivier Bonami and Martin Honcoop, whose sharp questions led me to significant 
clarifications of the main claims. 
IThe hypothesis that bare plurals are headed by a null Det (Longobardi ( 1 994» might 
be correct, but the evidence should be exclusively syntactic in nature. 
2Analyses of this kind have been independently proposed or suggested by several 
authors (see in particular Heim ( 1987), Dobrovie-Sorin ( 1 988, 1993, chapter 7) and 
Obenauer ( 1 995). 
3 Although non-ambiguist theories are conceptually appealing,  they have been shown 
to be empirically inadequate. Carlson's theory cannot account for the ambiguity of 
examples such as Hurricanes arise in this part of the Pacific, and the Kratzer-
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Wilkinson-Diesing approach is confronted with the problem of generic objects (see § 
3 .4. below). 
4 A parameter is needed, which could be related to the presence or absence of 
expletive overt determiners (see Vergnaud&Zubizarreta ( 1992)). 
5Chierchia ( 1996) provides some Italian examples with modified and conj oined 
BNPs which he analyzes as being interpreted generically. The Romanian and 
Spanish counterparts of those examples are however extremely marginal, if  not 
altogether ungrammatical (on the generic reading). Also, Chierchia does not propose 
an explicit analysis of the data. Pending on further research, I leave these examples 
aside in the present context. 
6Carlson ( 1 977) argues against group/set-denotation for generic B NPs, but his main 
point is that generic BNPs are intensional. Note however that intensionality need not 
be part of the denotation of the BNP itself, but may be contributed by the main 
predicate of the clause. 
7Kind-denotation is however assumed by all theorists for those BNPs that appear in 
the context of kind-predicates such as be extinct, be widespread, etc. 
8The new line of research that emerges is much closer to analyses proposed by 
French authors, see in particular AttaI ( 1 976), Kleiber ( 1 98 1 )  and Galmiche ( 1 986), 
who, ignoring the s- vs i-level distinction, rely on the hypothesis that those sentences 
that take existential readings describe a process, and only indirectly introduce an 
individual in the discourse (in other words, existential readings appear in thetic 
judgments). 
9 As observed by Condoravdi, quasi-universal BNPs presuppose the existence of the 
individuals they refer to. Thus, in an example such as ( l l )a the existence of top­
models is presupposed, which clashes with the context provided by the rest of the 
clause (top-models generally do not attend Chomsky's lectures; in such a context, the 
existence of top-models can be asserted, but is hard to presuppose). 
l OThe idea defended here,  that (Space) localization is the discriminating factor 
between the classes of predicates that allow and those that disallow the existential 
reading of BNPs, was independently proposed by McNally ( 1 995). Which does not 
mean that the two proposals are identical. Thus, McNally does not correlate Space­
localizability and possibility of the existential closure of th-variables. Her proposal 
relies on Ladusaw's ( 1 994) hypothesis that weak readings are allowed only in thetic 
judgments, but the relation between thetic judgments and Space localization remains 
quite vague: "Something about location independence precludes the indirect means of 
introducing discourse-referents . "  (p. 1 1 ) .  Note also that since McNally's empirical 
criterion is Space-independence rather than Space-localization, it may be difficult for 
her to explain why certain Space adjuncts (in particular those that appear with i-level 
predicates) do not make the predicate "Space-dependent" (see the examples in ( 1 8)­
( 1 9)). 
1 1 In a series of recent papers, Glasbey ( 1 995, this volume) argued that (almost) any 
kind of predicate, including some of our entity-predicates may allow the existential 
reading of subject BNPs if we provide an adequate context. This does not mean that 
the attempt of isolating a class of predicates that allows existential BNPs more easily 
(i.e., without the need of a special context) is useless. Glasbey herself distinguishes 
between Austinian and Russellian predicates: Austinian predicates allow existential 
BNPs quite freely, whereas Russellian predicates allow them only if we provide well­
chosen contexts. It is interesting to observe that Space-localization seems to be the 
necessary ingredient of these contexts. 
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1 2Some of the examples in (27) are grammatical in certain contexts, but the only 
possible reading is the quasi-universal reading, which relies on an entity-denoting 
BNP. McNally ( 1995) argues that in certain cases the existential reading is allowed: 
(i) Holes were in his pants. 
I believe that in examples of this type the subject is focalized. The role of focalization 
is an entirely different issue, which will be left aside here. 
1 3 A clear contrast exists between unmodified PPs and PPs such as all over the floor, 
all along the road, throughout the pudding (see Iackendoff ( 1 990, p 102» : 
(i) Water was all over the floor. 
(ii) Telephone poles were all along the road. 
These examples show that certain PPs constructed with the copula allow the 
existential reading of B NPs. In descriptive terms, one may use Iackendoffs 
characterization in terms of Distributive Location. Such predicates assert that the 
subject "in some sense extends over the whole space subtended by the object of the 
preposition" . Such predicates not only allow existential BNPs, but moreover they 
block existential indefinites: 
(iii) * Some water was all over the floor. 
(iv) *Some telephone poles were all along the road. 
More work is needed in order to integrate the behavior of these locatives to the 
account presented here. It seems to me that these examples do not constitute evidence 
against our account, they only call for further refinements. 
1 4The results summarized in this section were obtained during joint work with 
Brenda Laca, and included in Dobrovie-Sorin&Laca ( 1996). 
1 5This account leaves unexplained the fact that in these examples the object B NP 
cannot be interpreted as kind-denoting. Since the object position may, but need not be 
bound by existential closure, this position is available for entity-denoting expressions: 
(i) John owns La Tour Eiffel. 
Thus, the fact that the object BNPs in (33)-(34) cannot take the kind-reading cannot 
be analyzed as a type-matching constraint imposed by the verb. Some other constraint 
must be proposed, which is specific to kind-denoting expressions. 
1 6Generic objects constitute a serious problem for the Kratzer-Wilkinson-Diesing 
approach according to which generic BNPs contribute variables bound by Gen. 
Within such a theory, the generic reading of object BNPs can only be derived by 
assuming that the object BNP appears in the restriction of Gen at LF. The problem is 
that this hypothesis predicts that in examples such as (3 1 )  the generalization bears on 
pairs of boys&girls or students&professors, whereas the intuitive reading is one 
according to which the generalization bears on the subject alone : the properties of 
loving girls/respecting professors are attributed to boys and students, respectively. 
Furthermore, this analysis incorrectly predicts that singular indefinites in the object 
position of the same verbs are forced to take the generic reading. Krifka&alii ( 1 995) 
are thus led to conclude that with verbs such as love, hate, etc. ,  object BNPs are 
kind-denoting, but they propose no explanation for this generalization. 
17 Compare the monotonicity properties of examples such as (i), where the BNP may 
take the existential reading because it combines with an existential predicate: 
(i) Girl-students were dancing in the street => Students were dancing . . .  
( i ' )  3x [x were dancing A girl-students (x)] . 
1 8This view goes against Diesing ( 1 992), who assumes that (i) existential closure 
applies to the VP-domain and (ii) indefinites occurring outside VP of necessity 
translate as quantifiers (and correlatively take a presuppositionaVpartitive reading). 
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